In his model of price-setting duopoly (I897, I922), Edgeworth envisaged a market where firms set prices, and trade occurs between households and firms given those prices. Edgeworth assumed trade was governed by a particular voluntary-trading constraint: that the output of any firm is the lesser of its demand -and its 'supply', where the latter is interpreted as the profitmaximising output at the price set (this is particularly clear in his I922 review where he considers firms with quadratic costs).
also in this model firms are able to directly set their own price, unlike in supply-function equilibria where price is determined by a market-clearing condition. The model presented also differs from price-output games (Shubik, I959, ch. 4; Boyer and Moreaux, I987; Friedman, I988), where firms choose output produced and prices (sales then being the minimum of output and demand). The key difference is that in these papers production costs are incurred at the chosen output irrespective of actual sales. No pure-strategy equilibrium exists in these models. Perhaps the closest approach to this paper is in the strategic-market game literature (e.g. Simon, I984, and in particular Dubey, I982). Apart from the fact that Dubey considers an exchange economy, the crucial difference is that in his model agents do not directly set prices, as in this paper. 1 The model presented provides an account of how price-setting firms behave as if they were price-takers, and set the competitive price. Whilst it has been known for some time that the competitive outcome is the only possible equilibrium in pure strategies in an Edgeworth duopoly (Shubik, I 959, p. IO I), non-existence is endemic. The advantage of the price-quantity game presented in this paper is that not only is the competitive outcome the only possible equilibrium, but also that existence is guaranteed under fairly weak conditions. As we show, equilibrium exists in the classic case of duopoly with quadratic costs. Existence rests on the idea that in equilibrium firms are willing to offer to trade beyond their profit-maximising output at the competitive price. This offer to trade will not be called upon (since if all firms set the competitive price, they will sell their competitive output). However, the offer to trade beyond their competitive output may serve to deter firms from deviating from the competitive outcome by raising their price, since in this event the remaining firms will raise output and hence reduce the deviant's demand and profits. In Section I we outline the model, in Section II we characterise the equilibrium, and provide the example of duopoly with quadratic costs.
I. THE MODEL
There are n firms i = I, ... , n, who each set price pi E [o, oo), and vector of all prices being P E Rn and P_ E Rn-1, the n-I vector of all prices except Pi. Each firm i has the same cost function giving total cost as a function of output Xi.
Assumption I: costs
All firms i = I... n have the cost function c(xi), which is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and continuously differentiable.
Given Assumption I, we can define the standard profit and supply functions:
S(p) = arg max p I x-c(x) 6(p) = maxp.x-c(x).
' In Dubey, agents make an offer to trade of the form: 'if the price of commodityj is Pj or less, I am willing to buy (sell) up to qj' (i 982, p. I I 3). The eventual equilibrium price is determined so as to make the offers to trade on both sides of the market consistent. Similarly, in Simon (I984), the market price is determined by 'arbitrageurs', who exploit the differences between bid and ask prices on both sides of the market. In this paper, agents on one side of the market (firms) set their own price directly. The demand side is described by an atomless probability space (H, T, j Although consumers may differ in income, they have common preferences. Due to homotheticity, the total demand of a particular subset A s T of consumers depeilds on their total income, and not its distribution.
Having outlined the basic assumptions, we will specify how the market works. We extend the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth framework to allow each firm i to specify not only price PI, but also qi, the maximum quantity which it is willing to sell at that price. Firms simultaneously choose (PI, qi), and qi is taken to be a credible pre-commitment to produce up to qi: firm i can be obliged to sell up to qi through some explicit legally binding contract or implicit loss of reputation. In the traditional Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium (Edgeworth, I922; Shubik, I959; Dixon, i987a), qi is not chosen: rather, qi is the profitmaximising output at PI, i.e. qi = S(PI). In the Chamberlinian model where firms always meet demand, qi is assumed to be large or unbounded.2
What limits the ability of firms to choose how much they offer to sell? Following the supply-function approach of Grossman (i 98 I, p. I I 5 7 (I2 b)), it seems reasonable to assume that no firm can be forced to sell an output that will make it go bankrupt. Therefore, we define the bankruptcy supply-function o: Y* gives the total income needed by any subset A of consumers in order for them to wish to buy S(P) units of output at price P. Since total consumer income is i, we use this to bound Y*. Now, if a particular firm k sets a price Pk and sells all of its offered output qk, the total income of the consumers who purchase its output is (qk/S(pk) Y* (Pk) .
Given the prices P set by firms, the number of firms setting the same price as firm i is given by ni(P) =4#k= i,... n: = Pi}.
Clearly, ni(P) = I almost everywhere, and is discontinuous when n(P) > i.
The rationing mechanism is as in Edgeworth (i897, I922): consumers buy from the lowest-priced firm they are able; if there is excess demand for a lowerpriced firm, customers are rationed on the basis of first-come-first-served, which may be random or deterministic (see Dixon I987 b)). The contingent demand for higher-priced firms consists of those turned away by the lower-priced firms, and depends only on their total income. Since individual customers are of measure zero, the contingent demand will be deterministic irrespective of whether the rationing is random or deterministic. Formally, the firm's contingent demand function di (P, q) gives demand for firm i as a function of all firms' prices and offers. The fact that firms can offer to sell up to qi means that in effect we have a 'voluntary' trading constraint which gives total output produced and sold as xi = min (qi, di). In the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth model, we have qi = S(PI), and there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium (under Assumptions I-3), but a mixed-strategy equilibrium does exist (Dixon, I984; Maskin, I986). Note that the payoff function in this P-q game is discontinuous in prices, and that best-response functions are not always defined, as in the standard model.
II. EQUILIBRIUM
We will show in Theorem I that all pure-strategy equilibria in the modified Bertrand-Edgeworth model (Ai, Il: i = I ... n) will involve the firms setting the competitive price 0 and producing the competitive output S(0), and we give sufficient conditions for existence. We will define the competitive price in two equivalent ways. We assume S(P) > o to rule out zero production competitive outcomes, so
that P > 0 > o. Definition 2 (a) is standard; 2 (b) states that total household income (RHS) is sufficient to just purchase the supply n. S of firms at 0(LHS). The strict monotonicity properties of b, S and Y* ensure that 0 is unique, and that there is excess supply (demand) as P exceeds (is lower than) 0.
The crucial difference between this model and the standard BertrandEdgeworth model is that we have extended firms' strategies to allow them to choose qi * s1(Pi). As a preliminary step, Lemma I determines when firms will take advantage of this opportunity. QED. Lemma I establishes that no firm will wish to offer to sell more than S(PI) in equilibrium if demand exceeds S(PI), since otherwise it could offer to sell less and increase its profits. Conversely, if it does offer to sell more than S(Pi), demand must be less than S(PI). Furthermore, a firm will only offer to sell less than S(Pi) if di < q1, otherwise it could increase profits by choosing a larger qi. QED.
There will in general be many equilibria, so long as firms are willing to offer to supply enough output at 0 to make it not worth while for a Nash-deviant to raise its price. In particular, the condition given by the Theorem is sufficient for n-I firms to be able to satisfy all the demand at 0: clearly, they may leave unsatisfied demand whilst still making a price rise unprofitable. Furthermore, note that in the absence of the no-bankruptcy constraint an equilibrium would I992] COMPETITIVE OUTCOME 307 always exist for n > i: each firm could for example offer to serve the whole market at the competitive price.3 The Theorem gives a condition for existence that does not violate no-bankruptcy. How robust is the equilibrium? Let us first consider the standard Bertrand equilibrium where firms have the same constant average/marginal costs and set price equal to this unit cost: this equilibrium involves firms playing a weakly dominated strategy, and is not trembling-hand perfect (see Harrington (I990) for a more formal statement and analysis). Clearly, setting price equal to unit cost yields zero profits whatever other firms do, whilst higher prices sometimes yield positive profits. Also, if there is any chance that the other firm(s) will set a price above unit cost, it will pay a firm to set its own price above unit cost. The equilibrium proposed in this paper is no better than in the standard Bertrand equilibrium. As should be clear from the proof of Lemma i, the equilibrium strategy (0, o-(0)) is weakly dominated by (0, S(0)). Furthermore, if firms 'tremble', or there is any uncertainty introduced into demand, the firms will not be willing to offer to trade in excess of S(0). However, in defence of the proposed equilibrium, we would argue that it can be used for a much more general class of cost functions than the standard Bertrand and Bertrand-Edgeworth approaches.
An example: Duopoly with Quadratic Costs
Let us take the classic case of duopoly n = 2 with quadratic costs: c(x) = c. x2. Hence S(P) = P/2c, cr(P) = P/c. The exact nature of demand is not important for establishing existence: simply let the competitive price be 0. We propose that (0, a(0)) is an equilibrium: each firm sets Pi = 0, produces Xi = 0/2c, and offers to sell qi = 0/C = 2. Xi. Note that the condition of Theorem I is met.
To check that this is indeed an equilibrium, note that if either duopolist raises its prices above 0, the other will meet all demand at 0 (since qi = 2 . S(0)), and there will be no demand for the higher-priced firm.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a simple solution to the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth models. By generalising Edgeworth's trading process to allow firms to choose how much they are willing to sell as well as their price, we establish both that pure-strategy equilibria exist under fairly weak conditions, and that any equilibria yield the competitive outcome.
This result is of interest for two reasons. It provides a simple non-cooperative foundation for the competitive outcome, and shows how price-setting firms might behave as if they were price-takers. Unlike the Cournot paradigm, it does not rely on large numbers; unlike the standard Bertrand approach it does not rely on constant marginal/average costs. The price-quantity game presented can be applied to model competitive equilibrium in any market with convex costs and price-setting firms. Secondly, the model solves the existence To show that 0 is the only possible SPE, let us assume the contrary, P $ 0. Either P > 0 or P < 0. If P < 0, there will be excess demand (from Lemma I no firm will choose qi > S(P):
di (P, q) > b (P) [ Y(H) -(n-i) S(P) Y * (P) ] > S(P).
Since b is continuous, by raising its prices to some P+ e, i can still sell S(P), thus raising profits by eS(P). If P > 0, there will be excess supply.
di (P, q) = (P) Y(H) < S(P).
Hence IM(P, q) < .(P). By undercutting and choosing q' = S(P-e):
sup HJ[P-e, P, S(P-e), q-1] = C(P)-e>O Hence the firm can increase its profits, the desired contradiction. Since we have contradiction by assuming an SPE P > 0 and P < 0, it follows that if an SPE exists, P = 0.
QED.
